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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
G & G ~liNING COMPANY, 
Petitioner 
-vs.-
TAX COM~1ISSION OF THE STATE 
OF UTA.H 
' Respondent 
PETITIONERS' BRIEF 
STATE~iEN1~ OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8595 
The questions here involved relate to the assess1neni 
of the Mine Occupation Tax pursuant to Chapter 5, 
Title 59, []tah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. The 
Tax Commission in its decision No. 166 dated the lOth 
day of Septe:mber, 1956, decreed that the petitioners be 
ordered to pay to the State Tax Commission a Mine 
Occupation Tax based upon sales of ore during 1.954 in 
the sum of $12,628.08 (R. 72). 
The action arises out of mining operations con-
ducted by the petitioners on a portion of the MiVida 
claim o'vned by Utex Exploration Company pursuant 
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to the terms of an instrument designated "Lease'' made 
and entered into on the 11th day of February, 1953, be-
tween the lJtex Exploration Company, a Utah corpora-
tion, designated therein as lessor, and Archie Garwood, 
R. C. Gerlach and W. E. Bozman, designated therein as 
lessees (R. 11, 84, Exhibit 1). The taxpayers are all 
residents of Cortez, Colorado (Exhibit 1). The lease 
was for a term of two years expiring on February 11, 
1955. During the term of the lease the lessees, as a 
1natter of convenience, 'vere referred to by Utex as G & G 
~lining Company (R. 10-11). The lessees, which shall 
hereinafter be referred to as the petitioners, mined, re-
lnoved and sold ore from the premises beginning Feb-
ruary 11, 1953, until November 17, 1954 (R. 13). During 
the operations of the petitioners ore \Yas shipped to an 
.. ~EC purchaser and upon settlement litex Exploration 
Company was paid directly the percentage of production 
provided by the lease, the petitioners only accounting 
to l~tex for any under pay1nent (R. 2±). 
On or about the 17th day of X ove1nber, 195±, the 
petitioners rereiYed a letter from lTtex Exploration 
(
101npany ter1ninating the lease and follo·wing Xove1nber 
1 !J, J 9:l-±, the petitioners llaYe neYer urined, re1noved or 
:-;old ore frou1 the ::\[il~ida elain1 and ha-v-e not conducted 
any 111ininp; operation~ on ~aid property (R. 16, Exhibit 
B). 
On July 21, 1955, the petitioners filed with the Tax 
C~on11nission a ~tate1nent of Occupation Tax of Mines 
and paid to the Tax Conunission the su1u of $9,697.1± 
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(R. 22-35, Exhibit 1). This return was filed by petitioners 
as the result of discussions between them, the Utex 
corporation and Mr. Higgs of the ·T.ax Commission (R. 
36). In November of 1955, as a result of their eviction 
from the premises by Utex, petitioners were engaged in 
litigation with the Utex corporation in the Federal Court 
in Salt Lake City (R. 14, 39, 40). At that time the 
attorneys for Utex voluntarily advised Mr. Higgs of 
the Tax Commission that the petitioners had not paid 
an occupation tax for the year 1955, and gave to 1Ir. 
Higgs the figures relating to the overall production of 
the petitioners for the period of their operation of the 
1\1iVida property (R. 39-40). As a result of these cir-
cumstances, 1Ir. Higgs, by the process of subtracting 
the figures in ~the return furnished in July from those 
furnished by Utex, determined that the petitioners owed 
a tax in the amount of $12,675.40 (R. 40). Under date 
of November 4, 1955, the Executive Seeretary of the 
Comrnission wrote a letter to petitioners stating that, 
according to their information, they owed a !fine Oc-
cupation Tax for 1955 in the amount of $12,675.40 (R. 
39-40). A statement of 1v!ine Occupation Tax "\Yas en-
closed with the letter but was never signed by petitioners 
(R. 17). 
In the July return the sum of $641,850.45 was in-
cluded for the purpose of determining the tax. This 
amount of money represented production from February 
11, 1953, until October 1, 1953 (R. 33). In computing the 
te,x for 1953 based upon decisions of the Supreme Court 
that uranium ore during the period of January 1 to 
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C)ctoher 1, 1953, was not taxable, petitioners arrived at 
the sum of $3,289.44 as the tax due in 1953 (R. 32-33). 
In figuring the tax for 1954 Theron Moffett, a Certified 
Public Accountant called by petitioners, stated that he 
arrived at a 1954 tax in the amount of $12,628.08. He 
then gave credit for the over payment in 1953, arriving 
at a net tax of $6,209.58 (R. 34). These figures were 
hased upon the actual amount of ore shlpped regardless 
of when payment was received (R. 34). In computing 
the tax for the same years, based upon the amount of 
1noney actually received for ore sold during the tax 
period, )Jr. ~foffett testified that the petitioners owed 
for 1953 the sun1 of $1,793.13, and the money paid in 
.July of 1955 results in an over paYJuent in the 8um of 
$7,904.01. Figuring the year 1954 on the same basis, 
and giving credit for the o-ver payment, )Ioffett testified 
that the petitioners owed a tax in the a1nount of $1,604.48 
( R. :~2-35, 53-66). The testimony of ){r. :Jioffett re-
lating to the con1putation of tax is set forth in Exhibit 
[) at page 105 of the record. 
POINT I 
A PERSON WHO IS NOT ENG .. -\GED IN THE BUSINESS 
OF MINING OR PRODUCING ORE CANNOT BE SUBJECT 
TO THE MINE OCCUPATION TAX. 
POINT II 
THE TAX IS ILLEGAL IN THAT 
(A) AN ASSESSMENT MADE OTHER THAN ... ~S PRO-
VIDED BY STATUTE IS A NULLITY, 
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(B) IT IS MANDATORY THAT THE TAX BE FIXED 
ON OR BEFORE A DAY CERTAIN. 
POINT III 
THE ASSESSMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE DE·CISIONS 
OF THIS COURT. 
POINT IV. 
THE TAX WAS NOT PROPERLY COMPUTED. 
ARGUl\tiENT 
POINT I 
A PERSON WHO IS NOT ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS 
OF MINING OR PRODUCING ORE CANNOT BE Sl~BJECT 
TO THE MINE OCCUPATION TAX. 
The Tax Commission has no authority to assess a 
tax unless there is specific statutory authority. The 
Legislative Act under which the taxing authority i~ 
exereised detennines the persons and properties to be 
taxed and the time at which the status is to be determined. 
The tax in question herein is the Mine Occupation Tax 
as set forth in Chapter 5, Title 59, Utah Code An·Jtotated 
1953. The authority to impose the tax is di reeted to 
persons engaged in the business of mining or producing 
ore. The particular statutory provision involved herein 
IS: 
"59-5-67. Occupation tax-Rate-Ba~is for 
computation-Annual exemption-When delin-
quent.-Except as herein otherwise specifically 
provided, every person engaged in the busines.s 
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of mining or producing ore *** in this state shall 
pay to the state of Utah an occupation tax * * *." 
~rhe taxable status of the persons and property 
enu1nerated in the statutory provision above referred to 
is fixed by Section 59-5-73, Utah Code AVfllnotated 1953. 
The two sections read together set forth the category of 
the persons taxed and the time when the taxable status 
Is detennined. Section 59-5-73 reads as follows: 
59-5-73. Xotice of amount of tax.-Not later 
than the first l\Ionday in :May of each year, the 
tax commission shall fix the amount of occupation 
tax that each person shall pay***." 
The statutory provisions set forth the persons and 
the properties "\vhich may be subjected to the occupation 
tax and "\vould appear to be clearly defined. The tax is 
directed to nlining property which is produeing ore and 
to the persons who are engaged in the business of pro-
ducing and ~elling ores. ~rhis tax statns is fixed in that 
it 1nust be exi ~ting on or before the first day of ~lay as 
1 >roYided h~~ ~ertion 59-5-73~ supra. 
ln the instant ease the petitione1·s ,,~ere not ~ngaged 
in the hu~ine8~ of 1nining in 1955. It would be difficult 
to i n·norp t]H) }ano-ua!?.·e of the statute relatin~ to the 
,....., ~ \..l '-' 
occupation or aetivity "~hirh is taxed. In tlris respect 
tl1(\ natnrt\ of tht\ tnx Jna~~ have son1e in1portance. An 
oeeupation tnx is n rPYenue tax i1nposed upon the priv-
i lPg-P of doing busines8. It is distinguished from a license 
tnx in that tlH\ lath)r is a 1neasure used to regulate and 
prohibit ePrtain business activities. This latter dis-
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tinction is set out in Pro1)0 C/ity v. Provo Meat & Packing 
Co., 49 Utah 528, 165 P. 477: 
"As pointed out in the case of Salt Lake 
City v. Christensen Co., sup:va, the merchant's 
ordinance imposes a tax which is in the nature of 
an occupation tax rather than a license tax or 
license fee. The term 'occupation tax' is, ho,v-
ever, sometimes also applied to a license fee or 
license tax, and thus some confusion h.as at times 
arisen concerning the meaning of the two terms. 
Properly speaking, a license fee or a license tax 
comes within and is based upon the police power 
of the state to regulate or to prohibit a particular 
business. Such a fee or tax is primarily intended 
to regulate .a particular calling or business, and 
not to raise revenue, while an occupation tax is 
primarily intended to raise revenue by that meth-
od of taxation." 
The business of mining is not one of the trades or 
occupations which a State would regulate or prohibit 
by the exercise of its police power through a taxing 
statute. While the tax is based upon a specific valuation 
of property within a certain territory, assessed at a 
stated period and collected at .an appointed time, it is 
not a property tax. 
The difference bet"lvVeen the tax involved herein and 
a property tax, in the ordinary sense of the word, is that 
it is a tax relating to the activity of mining or producing 
ore rather than the o\vnership of property. In Gl An1. 
Jur., Taxation, Sec. 29, p.age 57, it states as follows: 
"Section 29. Generally.-Taxes on vroperty 
are taxes assessed on all property or on all prop-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
erty. of a certain class located within a certain 
~erntory on a specified date in proportion to 
Its value, or in accordance with some other reason-
able m~tho~ of apportionment, the obligation to 
pay wh1ch IS absolute and unavoidable and is not 
based upon any voluntary aciion of the person 
assessed. A property tax is ordinarily measured 
by the. amount of property owned by the taxpayer 
on a given day, and not on the total amount owned 
hy him during the year. It is ordinarily a8sessed 
at stated periods determined in advance, and col-
lected at appointed times, and its payment is 
usually enforced by sale of the property taxed 
and, occasionally, b:~ imprisonment of the person 
assessed. • • =~= ." 
... -\.s heretofore stated, the oecupation tax is not a 
property tax and it is doubtful if it can be construed 
a~ a :--:everance tax for the reasons that the language is 
not su~<~ptible to such construction and there is a serious 
• 1ue~tion as to "Thether or not there is a constitutional 
prohibition on severance ta..-x. Section 1:? of .. A.rtiele 13, 
('rnuditutiou of r-;tah, provides as follows: 
H Nothing in this Constitution shall be con-
~trued to preyent the Legislature from providing 
a ~tan1p tax. or a t~x based on ineon1e, oceupation, 
licen~e~ or franchises. { ~\s a.Inended ~ oYeinber 
(}, 1906) . " 
'PhP eon~t itut ionn I proYi sion iten1izes the taxe~ ·which 
a rn not prt'VPntPd by other constitutional provisions. A 
~('\·Prance tax is not 1nentioned and in aceord "ith the 
-~·t·neral rulP~ of inh'rpretation, "There there is an ite1ni-' 
~.n tion. thP i ntt'ntion i~ that the ite1nization is eon trolling. 
\V (' enne1ude thn t it i~ a tax on the privilege of carrying 
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on the activity of mining, which is consistent with the 
language of the statute. To be subje·et to the tax it would 
seem to require that there be mining property within the 
State and that the person be engaged in the mining busi-
ness. If either of the £~actors are missing at the time 
fixed by the statute, there is no authority to assess the 
tax. Box Elder Co1.tnty et al. 't:. Conley, County Assessor,. 
et al., 79lTtah 199, 284 P. 105: 
" 'Of course, it is necessary that there be a 
time as of which the taxable situs of property 
is to be fixed, whether the situs is dependent on 
the location of the property or of the person. Gen-
erally, a date is fixed by statute as of which the 
situs of property for purpose of taxation depends, 
at least so far as the place within the state where 
property is to be taxed is concerned. * * *' " 
In the instant case the tax was directed at the ~fi­
v·ida mining claim in San Juan County owned by Charles 
Steen. During the year 1955 petitioners were not living 
in Utah, but were residents of the State of Colorado. 
During said year they were not conducting any mining 
operations nor engaged in the business of rnining or 
producing ore on the Mi\7.ida claim. This points up the 
time at which the taxable status is. determined. The 
statute is clear that the assessrrient is to be rnade on or 
before the first Monday of May of each year. In vie"r 
of the fact that it is directly tied to a calendar year, it 
cannot be construed to be a tax for any year except the 
year in which it is assessed. The fact that the statute 
provides that the prior year's production is the basi~ 
for the computation of the tax does not obliterat~e the 
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~rov~si.on that it is a tax on the privilege of engaging 
In m1n1ng business in the year assessed. In the case of 
Title Insurance and Trust Company v. Franchise Tax 
Board (Cal. 1956) 302 P. 2d 79, the California Court 
stated as follows: 
"The franchise tax here levied was for the 
privilege of doing business in 1943 regardless of 
the fact that a prior year's earnings constituted 
the 1neasuring rod of the amount of the tax. A 
tax for the privilege of doing business within the 
~tate is no less a tax upon this year's privilege be-
cause measured by last year's income. Is not 
sueeess in the recent past the best criterion for 
1neasuring the value of doing business now~ Since 
the forn1ula prescribed by the legislature for de-
ri,ing the taxes due by a trust company furnishes 
an approxin1ation of the amount accrued and since 
there appears no abuse of power by the legisla-
tion. it "~ill not be disturbed. See Fulleton Oil 
C\). Y. J ohn~on, ~ CaL 2d 162, 175. 39 P. 2d 796." 
This l 1ourt ha:' preYiously stated that this tax is on 
orP 1nined in the :-ear prior to the year in \Yhich the tax 
lH\e~une d<)linquent. Consolidated ['Tranilnn ]lines, Inc. 
r. Ta.r ('onnni .... -.~iou of the State of [7tah (1955), 4 Itah 
:!d :2:~fi. :2~)1 P. :2d 8~(). Ho" .. ever, persons n1ust be engaged 
in th<) bu~in0~~ in the :-ear the tax is assessed. The tax 
hPrP inYnlYPd 1nn~t be assE::•ssed on or before the first 
~I nnda~· in ~[ny c_)f 193~l. The petitioners "~ere not en-
p;n.~<'d in t ht' hn~inc.·~~ of 1nining or producing ore on the 
'I i \:--ida elnin1 at anY tiine during· the Y~nr 1955 and ·were 
. ~ . 
not n\~idP11t~ of tlH' 8tah_• of l ... tnh or doing anything in 
l Ttah \rhieh \\·onld 8Ubjee.t then1 to the taxing authority. 
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The Legislature did not intend by the language used to 
tax such persons. 
POINT II 
THE TAX IS ILLEGAL IN THAT 
(A) AN ASSESSMENT MADE OTHER THAN AS PRO-
VIDED BY STATUTE IS A NULLITY, 
(B) IT IS MANDATORY THAT THE 'TAX BE FIXED 
ON OR BEFORE A DAY CERTAIN. 
Notwithstanding the question as to whether or not 
a particular person or property is subject to a tax, the 
taxing authority must act within the scope of the Con-
stit~ltional and Legislative authority. This is pointed 
out in Moss, County Atty., ex rel. State Tax Com1nission 
v. Board of C1om'rs of Salt Lake City, et al., (1953), 1 
Utah 2d 60, 261 P. 2d 961: 
"The City's power to tax is derived solely 
from legislative enactment and it has only such 
authority as is expressly conferred or necessarily 
implied. This court has not favored the extension 
of the powers of the city by implication, and the 
only modification of such doctrine is where the 
power is one which is necessarily implied. Un-
less this requirement is met, the power cannot be 
deduced from any consideration of convenience 
or necessity, or desirability of such result, and no 
doubtful inference from other powers granted or 
from ambiguous or uncertain provisions of the 
law would be sufficient to sustain such authority. 
This is a fortiori true in the instant situation, be-
cause in case of any ambiguity or uncertainty as 
to authority to impose taxes, the doubt rnust be 
resolved in favor of the taxp:ayer." 
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And where there is doubt as to the intention of the Legis-
lature the statutes must be construed in favor of the 
taxpayer. w·. F. Jensen Candy Co. 1.i. State Tax Commis-
sion (1936), 90 "Ctah 359, 61 P. 2d 629: 
"Having in mind the general rule that taxa-
tion statutes are strictly construed against the 
state and in favor of the taxpayer, the language 
of the statute permits the collection of the tax at 
the rate specified and no more." 
~.,or rille t·. State Tax Co1nJnission (1940), 98 l~tah 170. 
97 P. 2d 937: 
"The doctrine that taxing statutes are, in case 
of doubt as to the intention of the legislature to be, 
construed strictly against the taxing authority 
and in favor of those on whom the tax is levied, 
has been "·ell set out in the case of Helv~ring v. 
Stockhohns Enskilda Bank, 293 L'.S. 84, 55 S. Ct. 
!10~ 79 L. Ed. 211.~~ 
.\ ~ heretofore 1nentioned the mine occupation tax is 
fixed a~ of a tiine certain, that being the first ~Ionday in 
~fay of eaeh Year. The ~tatute refers to assessn1ent and 
. . 
not iee and. for conYenience. is again set forth: 
"fln-;)-7;t X otic.e of runount of tax. - Xot 
later than the fir~t ::\fondav- in :\IaY of each yeai\ 
thP tnx cn1nnu~~ion ~hall fix the ainount of occu-
pation tax that t'nrh person shall pay. lminediat~-
1 ". tlH' rt'a fter t lH:' person "~hose occupation tax 1s ~·o fi X('d ~hall ht' notified by 1nail, postage prepaid, 
nddr('~~('d to hi8 last know·n pla<"e of residence~ 
of t hP runount of the occupation tax so fixed." 
[Tfah Code Annotated 1953. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
It is generally held that where a statute fixes a time for 
assessinent such provisions are mandatory. 53 C.J.S., 
Licenses, Section 49, page 671: 
"Time for assess1nent. Generally the tax offi-
cials must make their assessment within the statu-
tory time, or, where the statute does not fix a 
time, within a reasonable time." 
\Vhile it is recognized that certain statutory provisions 
relating to time have been interpreted as being merely 
directory, those provisions relate only to the orderly 
ad1ninistration of public affairs. The provisions of Sec-
tion 59-5-73, supra, are directly related to the taxpayer 
and is the only section setting forth the manner in which 
he vvill be advised of the assessment. It is the procedure 
hy which he knows the property and activity being tax 
and the amount thereof. Further it is the only oppor-
tunity he has to avoid penalty and interest charges. The 
taxpayer is subject to penalty and interest unless he 
p,ays his tax on or before June 1st, ordinarily a period 
of less than thirty days. Section 59-5-70 and Section 
59~5-71, Utah Code Annotated 1953. This proposition is 
set forth in 51 Am. Jur., Taxation, page 618: 
"Section 652.-~Iandatory and Directory Re-
quirements. - \Vhile the statutes of Inost ~tatc'R 
provide in considerable detail how the "'ork of 
assessing the taxes sh.all be perform~ed, compli-
ance with all these provisions in exact conformity 
to the law is not necessarily a condition precedent 
to a valid tax. The test is whether the provision 
is for the benefit and protection of the individual 
taxpayer or is merely for the orderly administra-
tion of public .affairs. All those provisions which 
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are intended for his security, for insuring an 
equality of taxation, and to enable on·e to know 
with reasonable certainty for what real and per-
sonal estate he is taxed, and for what all those 
who are liable with him are taxed, are -conditions 
precedent which must be observed; otherwise, the 
assessment will be invalid. ***." 
It is manifest that the assessment and notice pro-
visions of the statute are for the protection of the tax-
payer. In the instant case the petitioners were first noti-
fied of the tax on November 4, 1955. At that tin1e they 
were subject to severe p·enalty and interest charges and 
were not accorded any process by which they could pre-
vent the possibility of these charges. 
We believe this Court has passed upon the nlanda-
tory effect of the provisions relating to the time fixed 
by the statute. While the Box Elder case, supra, relates 
to a different tax statute, both statutes relate to the 
status of the person and property and is for the protec-
tion of the taxpayer. The Court therein stated as follows: 
"The follo\ving cases support the general rule 
of law that, where the taxable status of property 
relates to a day certain in each year" no taxes can 
be legally ,assessed and levied for a particular 
year unless the conditions requisite to liability 
exist on the day fixed.'- Box Elder County ~c. Con-
ley, supra. 
The Idaho Court has given the san1e effect to statutes re-
lating to the status of property as of a eertain date. 
W1~nton L1unbcr Co. r. Shoshone Countp. et al .. (Idaho, 
1931)" ~9·+ P. 529: 
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""In this state property is .assessable for taxes 
as of the second Monday of January. C. S. Sec-
tion 3097, as amended by Sess. Laws 1927, c. 263, 
p. 562, Section 1.; Preston A. Blair Co. v. J·ensen 
(Idaho), 286 P. 366. That is, the status and value 
of property on that date controls the assessment 
for taxation. Preston A. Blair Co. v. Jensen, 
supra; Cle~arwater Timber Co. v. Nez P·erce 
County ( C.C.) 155 F. 633." 
rrhe provisions of Section 59-5-68, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, requiring the taxpayer to file a statement 
before ~-,ebruary lOth of the year does not do away with 
the assessment and notice provisions. The Tax Colnmis-
sion is not bound by such statement and makes its assess-
Inent independent thereof. One not engaged in mining 
\Vould not file the statem·ent for the obvious reason that 
the statute only refers to those so engaged. The language 
in respect thereof is clear and in the present tense, not 
relating to any previous year. It has been generally 
held that the statement of the taxpayer in such cases is 
not an assessment. F1airlarnb v. Bowle, County Treasurer, 
(Colo., 1937), 71 P. 2d 417 : 
"The mode of ntaking assessments is a legis-
lative function. Stanley v. Little Pittsburg 1vtin-
ing Co., 6 Colo. 415. It is for the assessor 'to 1nake 
an official estimate of value for the purpose of 
taxation. *** Making 01tt a list of property by the 
owner, with its estimated value, is not its assess-
ment.' People ex rei. IIallett v. Board of Arapa-
hoe County Cominissioners, 27 Colo. 86, 59 P. 733, 
735." (Emphasis added.) 
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If the tax involved herein is upheld, then a situation 
is presented where a tax liability is imposed where: 
1. 'rhe taxpayers are not residing in the State of 
Utah 
2. Were not engaged in the business of mining in 
the State of Utah 
3. We-re first notified four Inonths after such a. 
tax is delinquent 
4-. The tax 'vas not assesse;d 
5. Taxpayers had no notice of an assessn1ent, .and 
6. They are subject to penalties and interest "~th­
out notice of assessment. 
The letter of November 4, 1955 (R. 10±, Taxpa~Ters' 
Exhibit C) is the basis of the claiin by the Tax Cormnis-
sion. Section 59-5-73, Utah Code Annotated 1953, states 
without equivocation that the Tax Conn1rission shall fix 
the amount of the occupation tax. The letter of Novenl-
ber 4th is not in fact quite so unequivocal ..... t\.s a matter 
of fact it shows on its face that someone othPr than 
the Tax Comn1ission fixed the tax. The language of the 
Exhibit referred to is as follo"\YS: 
·~According to information rec.ently received 
by this offire your con1pany o,y·es n1ine occupation 
tax for 1955 in the an1ount of $12,675.40." 
A reasonable. construction to place upon that language 
is that the Tax Connnission is collerting a third party's 
tax obligation, other\\~ise \\Thy did it not say the Connnis-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
s1on has fixed your tax in the sun1 of $12,675.40 ~ If 
people are to be subjected to taxation in this manner, 
all that has been written by the Courts and all that has 
been enacted into law by the Legislature is for naught. 
The property here involved is probably the most famous 
lJtah n1ining property of re'Cent times. The petitioners 
had paid a surn of money to the Tax Commission on the 
21st day of July, 1955, which has no more legality than 
that no\\T claimed. Certainly under the circun1stances 
the Tax Commission could not say that it was unaware 
of the 1nining oper.ation and eertainly no one should be 
required to pay taxes twice on the same thing in the same 
year. 
POINT III 
THE ASSESSMENT IS CONTRAR.Y TO THE DECISIONS 
OF THIS COURT. 
The letter of N oven1ber 4th constitutes the only 
docu1nent notifying the taxpayer of the amount of occu-
pation tax fixed by the Corn1nission. As heretofore rnen-
tioned, it states that it is an occupation tax for 1955. If 
this be the assessment and the notice required by statute, 
then it is in direct conflict with the previous decisions of 
this Court. If it is .a n1ine occupation tax for 1955, it 
ntust be based upon ore mined and sold during the year 
1955. This Court in Consolidated Uran·ium Mines, Inc. v. 
Tn.r Commission of the State of [Jtah, 8Upra, stated: 
~'Since the tax is not delinquent until the first 
day of June next succeeding the calendar year 
\vhen the ore or 1netal is sold, this indicates that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
the tax is on the metal mined in the year prior to 
the year in which the tax becomes delinquent, and, 
therefore, an imposition of such a tax based on 
sales other than those made in the calendar year 
sought to be taxed violates the provisions of the 
Act. The Tax Commission, therefore, erred when 
it purported to base its assessment for the year 
1954 on sales made during the year 1953." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The Commission contends that the tax attempted 
to be collected is an assessment based upon sales of ores 
made during the ye.ar 1954. This is an afterthought 
otherwise the tax and what it was for 'vould have been 
set forth in the letter of November 4th. The manner in 
which the Tax Commission has acted is patently dilitory 
and contrary to the statutory provisions. The validity 
of its acts must be tested ag.ainst the statutory provisions 
and the decisions of this Court. Clearly under both no 
valid assessment was made and the attempt to collect 
the tax must fail. 
POINT IV. 
THE TAX WAS NOT PROPERLY COMPUTED. 
Since February 11, 1953, the petitioners haYe never 
be·en assessed a mine occnp.ation ta..'\: in any 1nanner 'vhat-
~oever. In July of 1955 the petitioners signed a state-
ment of 1nine occupation tax purporting to be a tax on 
1953 ore sales and paid the sun1 of $9,679.14. This pay-
ment was the result of conferences bet\Yeen the peti-
tioners, lTtex Exploration Con1pany and the Tax Conl-
Inj~sion (R. 3()). Tht' f.ailure to assess a tax in the 
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1nanner provided by law was not an oversight by the 
Commission or the careless exercise of a duty, nor was 
it because it was not aware of the petitioners' activity. 
The record shows that the property is the famous Steen 
claim, which is known to practically every man, woman 
and child in the State: of Utah, and it would be ridiculous 
to assume that the Tax Commission did not know of the 
1nining activity. 
The reason is apparent why the Commission never 
attempted to assess a tax against the petitioners. It re-
garded the tax as payable by Utex. The payment made 
in July 1955, in view of the factual situation, can only be 
regarded as an .adjustment of the tax obligation between 
the petitioners and Utex. The claim made by the letter 
of November 4th is of the same nature, the Tax Commis-
sion attempting to adjust the tax obligation between 
the. parties 1to a :contract. The payment in July 1955 
\v.as not paid under protest and was nothing more than 
a paJinent under mistake. It was not the result of any 
assessment, the r_eax Commission never claiming it made 
an assessment (R. 36). 
-\Vhether or not the petitioners have the right to re-
cover the n1oney fron1 the State of Utah is not involved. 
However, if the Court determines that the Commission 
assessed a tax in conformity with even a liberal interpre-
tation of the statute, then the statement filed in July of 
1955 should be considered together with the letter of 
November 4th and the two payments adjusted as if it 
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were one assessment. Certainly petitioners should not be 
subjecte·d to two assessments and two payments for the 
same tax in the same year. 
If the Comrnission is going to be permitted to tax in 
the manner that it did in this instance, then justice re-
quires that the petitioners be given every benefit and 
have every doubt resolved in their favor. Upon this 
premise the taxpayers should only pay, in the event they 
are co1npelled to pay a tax, the sun1 of $1,604.48. 
In computing the sum paid in July 1955 the an1ount 
of $640,850.45 was included in the computation which 
represent1ed sales of ore from February 11, 1953, to 
October 1, 1953. By reason of this Court's determination 
in Consolidated flrani1t1n ... Mines, Inc. 1). Tax Cornmission 
of the State of [Ttah, supra, this amount should not have 
been figured in the computation of the payrnent. Giving 
credit for this, the petitioners made an overpayn1ent in 
the sum of $7,90-!.01. Taking the figure expressed in the 
letter of November 4th, the petitioners would be subject 
to a pay1nent of $9,508.49. Giving effect to the over-
p,aynlent made in July 1955, the petitioners "\vould o,~ve the 
State of Utah $1,604.48. These figures and th·e coinputa-
tionH were testified to by Theron E. Moffett, a Certi-
fied Puhlie Accountant, ""ho had exa1nined the books of 
the petitioners. The testimony is found beginning at 
pag-P 31 to 39 and beginning at page 54 to 65. The testi-
IHOll)' and the 1nethod of con1putation is set forth in tax-
payf~rs' Exhibit D found at p.age 105 of the record. 
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CONCLUSION 
lipon the record in this case a tax is attempted to 
be collect~ed by the State of Utah under circumstances 
that ignores every statutory requirement. If there is any 
due process relating to the imposition of a tax, then the 
decision of the Tax Commission in the instant case must 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS, ~fATTSSON & E\TANS 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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